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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the evidence on developing country MNEs and outward FDI activity. We 
do not find evidence of an across-the-board growth in outward FDI from developing countries, 
either in magnitude, or geographically. Such growth is a narrow phenomenon, limited to a small 
group of home countries with relatively well-developed knowledge infrastructure, as well as 
innovation and business systems. These ‘new’ MNEs have been spurred by greater competition 
through liberalisation, and have sought to survive by upgrading of their firm-specific assets and 
one means to do so has been by internationalisation. Broadly speaking, much of the rapid 
expansion of DC MNE activity from countries such as India is not sustainable. We also discuss 
the effect of outward FDI on the knowledge base of the home countries of DC MNEs, as well as 
the role of DC MNEs in promoting South-South capital and knowledge flows. We argue that DC 
MNEs are not a superior option to conventional MNEs, as there are few differences in their 
modus operandi. Besides, MNE-assisted development still depends upon the capacity of the host 
country to efficiently utilise the spillovers and linkages potentially made available. Many of the 
DC host countries have endemic political instability, poor transport links and infrastructure, little 
skilled manpower and are distant from the most important markets. If developing countries are to 
attract more sophisticated projects they must provide stability, human capital, infrastructure and 
reliability.  
 
Keywords: FDI, MNEs, developing countries, development, absorptive capacity, knowledge 
flows, south-south, emerging markets. 
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Much ado about nothing, or sirens of a brave new world? MNE activity from developing 
countries and its significance for development 
 
Rajneesh Narula 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the growth of outward MNE activity from developing countries.  The 
changing nature of outward MNE activity from developing countries is worthy of note; however, 
its significance should not be overestimated. It does not reflect a fundamental shift in the world 
economy. Nor – on its own –is it evidence of a shift in economic power from the North to the 
South.  We argue that the growth of a group of firms of a given nationality does not always 
imply that their success can be extrapolated to the entire economy, or to other, differently-
structured economies. The developing world is not a homogenous grouping, unless globalisation 
requires the principles of the social sciences to be radically revised. We argue that they do not.   
We argue here that these patterns of FDI from developing countries – both at the firm level, 
as well as the country level - continue to reflect extant conceptual and theoretical models and 
principles, and insofar as these are understood and properly applied. When we follow this 
approach, we find no evidence of a massive take-off by DC MNEs across the board. Rather, we 
see consistently increasing outward activity by a specific group of firms from a select group of 
developing countries that can be accurately described as ‘emerging’. The term ‘emerging’ has 
been used with great abandon in recent years, but we use it here to mean countries that are at a 
stage of economic and industrial development – as reflected by their economic structure, 
absorptive capacity, and business and innovation systems – that permits their firms to 
industrialise rapidly. These firms may seek become MNEs, but such internationalisation 
presumes that that the firms have non-location-bound firm-specific assets that have the potential 
to be upgraded and augmented, and which therefore allow them to engage in (and control) long-
term value–adding activities in foreign locations that are commercially viable. This definition is 
intentionally specific. The points we will make are these: 
1. Not all outward FDI is indicative of superior firm-specific assets and initial advantages 
that are sustainable; 
2. Not all foreign investment is de facto FDI;   
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3. The firm-specific assets of DC MNEs are path-dependent, and reflect the resources, 
economic structure, technological capabilities and comparative advantages of the home 
country. This creates cognitive limits to the firm’s growth, whether at home or abroad. 
Apart from China and Russia, there has been no increase in the number of significant home 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and the Asian NICs were already outward investors by the 
1980s). This paper goes on to argue that the most important determinant of outward MNE 
activity is location advantages of the home country associated with a high level of domestic 
absorptive capacity. The countries that dominate sustainable outward MNE activity are those 
countries that have the capacity to generate and support innovative activities. 
As we will show, the much-commented tendency for DC MNEs to be in direct 
competition with ‘conventional’ does not represent a new, ‘third wave’. We argue that these 
MNEs represent a natural progression of earlier trends, hastened by increased liberalisation and 
greater cross-border competition. This reflects a simple convergence - DC MNEs are simply 
increasingly behaving increasingly like their developed country competitors. To use 
Ramamurti’s (2008a) terminology, DC MNEs have moved from being infant MNEs to 
adolescent MNEs in the past 30 years, and are converging upon the ‘mature’ MNE rapidly.  
This paper also discusses whether and under what circumstances outward MNE activity 
influences home country development. The last section discusses whether and how DC MNEs 
might contribute differently to host country development, and how this may or may not differ to 
conventional MNEs. The final section concludes with a look at possible future trends. 
 
2. MNE activities from developing countries: a background 
 
Much of the very early research on internationalisation of firms and the location of production - 
best exampled by Vernon’s (1966) effort- paid little attention to the differences in the nature of 
MNEs of differing home countries. Affiliates of developed country (at the time, US) MNEs were 
‘miniature replicas’ of their home country operations, truncated in response to firm specific 
characteristics and the host country characteristics.  This reflects to some extent the barriers to 
trade in a pre-liberalised world. It was also assumed that as follower countries converged, their 
MNE activity would operate in a similar manner to conventional MNEs.  
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However, this idea was challenged by the growing phenomenon of MNEs from the developing 
countries (see e.g. Lecraw 1977, Kumar and McLeod [eds] 1981, Lall [ed] 1983, Khan [ed] 
1987, Lecraw 1993). These authors argued that DC MNEs had specific characteristics that were 
distinct from those originating from the developed countries. As the publication of UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2006 attests to – a report which focuses in its entirety on this issue –the 
subject has now has become the subject of mainstream enquiry.  
 
Box 1: the key to understanding MNE activity – ownership advantages  
The key to engaging in any kind of rent-seeking activity is the possession of ownership 
specific advantages.  A firm’s competitive advantages derive from two types of firm-specific 
assets:  
1. Those associated with technological assets in the traditional sense of being 
technological/engineering assets, such as machinery and equipment, and in the 
personnel who operate and maintain them. These are asset-type ownership (Oa) 
advantages.  
2. The second type of firm-specific assets are those associated with conducting 
transactions efficiently, that derive from being able to generate rent by virtue of 
superior use of intra-firm hierarchies, both within and across national borders. In 
addition there are those that derive by virtue of the multinationality of the firms and 
can be termed ‘advantages of common governance’. These are transaction-type 
ownership (Ot) advantages (see Dunning 1993, Cantwell and Narula 2001).  
It is important to note that MNEs can exist in the absence of technology type ownership 
advantages, generating rent simply from its superior knowledge of markets and hierarchies.  
Ownership advantages are not advantages in the same sense as comparative advantages, in 
that they are not simply relative to other firms in the home country, or to domestic firms in the 
host country, but are advantages in relation to other firms that they compete with, regardless 
of nationality. 
It is important to note that innovative advantages are differentiated and relative concepts, not 
indicative of some notional technology frontier (Cantwell and Narula 2001). It is important to 
note that differentiated firm-specific strengths that constitute a firm's ownership advantages 
do not always imply an overall absolute cost advantage. Hence, firms that are not world 
leaders or do not hold an overall absolute cost advantage over most indigenous firms in the 
countries in which they invest may still have ownership advantages especially in operating in 
certain differentiated kinds of products and services.  In addition, the kinds of networks a firm 
is involved in – its relational assets – also provide an important O advantage.  
O advantages derive and are a function of the location advantages of their home country. 
Thus, the O advantages of firm reflect the comparative advantage of their home location and 
its economic structure, in addition to the kinds of firms (both MNE and domestic) present, and 
its knowledge infrastructure.  
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Much of the earlier empirical work – best described as the first wave - indicated a strong 
and marked trend for DC MNEs to focus their investments in neighbouring and other countries 
which were at a similar or an earlier stage of their development. This preference was a direct 
result of their lack of international experience - these locations had offered resource endowments 
for markets which were broadly similar to those of their home countries.  Furthermore, their 
ownership advantages were of a type most suited to these L advantages (and often induced by 
them), and were based on technologies at the end of their product life cycles (given that most 
developing countries had import-substituting programmes that limited the direct participation of 
MNEs). In other words, these DC MNEs had few transaction-type ownership advantages, and 
only the most basic form of asset-type ownership advantages - those that derived from the 
efficient acquisition and adaptation of imported technologies2. These advantages were enhanced 
by the prevalence of import-substituting, inward looking policy regimes amongst most 
developing countries whose relatively small markets encouraged small scale production, 
particularly suited to these MNEs. The assets of these firms were primarily country-specific, 
determined by the market distortions introduced by the home country policies, and only 
sustainable where similar location advantages existed in other countries. Indeed, as we will see in 
the next section, a majority of the outward FDI from developing countries still demonstrates a 
similar geographical bias. The first wave sketched a description of a ‘different’ kind of MNE that 
- so it was argued - differed considerably from that of ‘conventional’ industrialised country 
MNEs, in terms of its ownership advantages, motivation, geographical direction and mode of 
overseas activity.   
In a later contribution, Dunning et al (1998), argued that the evidence on DC MNEs had 
shown an evolution over time, and by the early 1990s, there was a second wave of FDI activity 
by DC MNEs, distinct from the first wave. Both waves existed simultaneously from the same 
home countries. The second wave MNEs tended to come from countries at a higher stage of 
industrial development that had evolved structurally towards industrial sectors which are capital- 
and knowledge-intensive. These firms engaged in simultaneously in outward FDI to locations 
with appropriate comparative advantages (often lesser developed countries) for their natural-
asset intensive and labour-intensive activities, while, at the same time, they also engaged in both 
                                                 
2
 See Lall (1983) for a succinct discussion. 
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market-seeking and asset-augmenting FDI in the more developed countries. In other words, they 
were increasingly becoming global, demonstrating features of ‘conventional’ MNEs.  
We have recently seen a flurry of publications on the rapid growth of MNEs from 
developing countries, which, from some accounts are now ubiquitous3. Further, this growth of 
new MNEs is regarded as indicative of the increasing competitiveness of their home countries, 
which (some have argued) herald the beginning of a new world order. Other publications have 
conducted case-studies of MNEs from a variety of developing countries, demonstrating- 
collectively – that this is a wide phenomenon, that include all but the least developed countries. 
Others have focused on China and India, or more broadly, on the BRICS.  Thus, in the next part 
of this paper we ask: does this evidence represent a ‘third wave’, with distinctly different 
characteristics from the previous two waves, or – as this paper proposes to show – that this new 
activity is simply a natural extension of the second wave? 
  
3. Gradual evolution of the second wave or a radical shift? 
What have been the reasons for the growth in DC MNEs activity over the last decade?  
Expanding from Dunning et al (1998)’s view that the first and second wave of DC MNEs 
represents part of a continuum, we will argue that the current ‘new wave’ can be characterised as 
an intermediate stage in the evolution of MNE activity, between the first wave DC MNEs and 
‘conventional’ MNEs4. Note that the conventional MNE from the developed countries as a 
homogenous group is very much a generalisation, and used here entirely for illustrative purposes.  
Not all are equally experienced in foreign activities, and indeed go through a similar evolution of 
size, structure, strategy, and assets as they expand abroad, much as DC MNEs have done.  
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of these three groups of MNEs. In many cases, the 
very same firms have simply shifted their focus over time from similarly endowed economies in 
the developing world, to investing in the developed countries. The evolution of the ‘first wave’ 
MNEs towards the ‘second wave’ MNEs was initially enhanced by the fundamental (but 
gradual) change in the structure of the world economy, much of which is often generalised as 
being a direct result of globalisation. These changes can be considered from the developing 
                                                 
3
 See for instance, contributions to Ramamurti and Singh (2008b). Also, see special issues of Industrial and 
Corporate Change 2009 (edited S. Athreye and S. Kapur), and Journal of International Management 2007 (edited by 
P. Aulakh).  
4
 Not all such MNEs are equally experienced in foreign activities, and indeed go through a similar evolution of size, 
structure, strategy, and assets as they expand. 
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country perspective as being of two kinds. First, there are those that have been largely exogenous 
to these countries but which have affected their economic structure both as members of the world 
economic order and as individual economies. Globalisation – in the sense of greater cross-border 
economic interdependence between firms, markets and countries - has impacted on firms by 
creating broader and more competitive markets across countries. This has had two effects on the 
developing countries:  
a. Firms in all countries (whether developing or developed) have potential access to 
larger markets. At the same time, the growing complexity of products and 
services (in that most now require a broader range of competences from different 
sectors) has raised the costs of innovation, design and production. Providing 
similar products across larger de facto markets has also become essential to defray 
the costs and risks of such sunk costs, and firms need to have large economies of 
scale and a high minimum efficient scale. This has meant that firms in these 
industrial sectors need to expand internationally to justify production;  
b. With falling tariff barriers and global accords such as those associated with the 
WTO, firms in developing countries that were able to generate economic rents in 
their protected home markets from mature products and services utilising 
‘inferior’ ownership advantages some distance away from the technological 
frontier were unable to continue do so, due to growing competition from 
developed country ‘conventional MNEs, whether through exports or FDI.  This 
has forced technological trajectories and standards to converge, such that there is 
greater international competition, and inter-sectoral competition.  
 
In other words, firms increasingly need to have competitive advantages that are globally 
viable, rather than domestically or regionally so, and this has been further enhanced by the 
innovation of space-shrinking technologies, falling trade barriers, and transportation costs 
(Narula and Dunning 2000).  
 There have also been structural changes within individual countries in direct response to 
these exogenous changes, and as such may be considered as endogenous to most developing 
economies. These endogenous changes are primarily associated with the actions and policies of 
governments. One of the most important of these changes over the past decade or so has been a 
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fundamental shift in the policy orientation of developing countries from an import-substituting 
role (or a centrally-planned one) to an export-oriented, outward looking one. The extent of 
liberalisation varies between countries: in some cases it is associated with a more pro-active and 
market facilitating role, while in others it is simply reactive or even laissez-faire. Nonetheless, 
despite this broad range of policy options, it is safe to generalise that most countries have a 
greater level of inward MNE activity, and this has fundamentally changed the market structure of 
most countries, in some cases crowding-out domestic actors, and in other cases, strengthening 
them. 
Growing competition at home has meant that the privilege of slow and gradual building-
up of ownership advantages through licensing and joint ventures is rarely an option. Nor can they 
continue to follow the product life cycle model and depend primarily on obsolete production and 
process technologies (for which markets may still exist in countries at lower stages), but must 
simultaneously also seek to emulate best practice.  
Most developing economies had also nurtured state-owned enterprises and national 
champions as part of their economic and industrial policies. They often also provided protection 
against competition, and subsidised their outward expansion (and this still remains the case in 
certain countries like China). Although various agreements within the WTO (combined with 
economic liberalisation) have led to the dissolution – or at least a weakening of such state 
support – this has paradoxically helped some5 to improve their ownership advantages by 
providing them with the initial impetus to internationalise. Others have responded to the 
challenge by expanding abroad rapidly in a more aggressive way. Greater competition has 
prompted other firms to upgrade their assets by partnering with foreign MNEs, while others have 
sought to improve their firm-specific assets through greater investment in R&D, whether at home 
or abroad. Firms that have survived have tended to do so by following the same ‘game plan’ as 
‘conventional’, MNEs in the use of (and integration into) global production networks and supply 
chains.  
Greater competition primarily from foreign entrants in the home market has had several 
consequences for firms that have hitherto operated in closed markets. Some of the more 
                                                 
5
 At the same time, some of the earlier internationalising firms proved to be not as successful as MNEs, particularly 
as rents from protected home markets began to dry up in a post-liberalisation scenario. A number of such firms have 
experienced considerable restructuring of their foreign operations, sometimes withdrawing completely by selling off 
their foreign assets 
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successful domestic firms were acquired (whether voluntarily or otherwise) by foreign investors 
(Narula and Marin 2005, Humphrey et al 1998) while others have sought to upgrade their 
O advantages to compete more effectively, although the extent to which firms have been 
aggressive about upgrading their technological capabilities, products and services has varied 
considerably (Giuliani et al 2005, Morris and Barnes 2008).   
Not all DC MNEs have been successful in expanding abroad, and as we discuss in a later 
section, not all have the requisite ownership advantages to do so. Indeed, the ones that have been 
successful are mainly those that have sought to be proactive about upgrading, through 
internationalisation. A number of these MNEs have expanded through M&A, although this 
phenomenon is much smaller in relative terms than many observers have made out (Barnard 
2006).  
To some extent, some of the ‘first wave’ characteristics of their activities will continued 
to reflect their home country origins, in maintaining a strong regional focus, as well as in the 
kinds of sectors they prefer to concentrate in. Nonetheless, a number of DC MNEs seek to 
present themselves not as MNEs from South Africa, India or China, but they adopt the modus 
operandi of ‘conventional’ MNEs (Barnard 2006).  Indeed, several of them relocated their 
headquarters to the US or the EU, and/or list themselves on stock markets there.  
Although some (see e.g. Gammeltoft 2008, Andreff, 2003) have argued that MNEs from 
the BRICS countries represent a ‘third wave’, we will argue that this simply represents a 
catching-up phenomenon. Rather, the so-called third wave is actually ‘Two Prime’ – an 
advanced version of the second wave. As DC MNEs evolve and acquire greater experience of 
international operations, competing directly with conventional MNEs, and managing cross-
border activities, they naturally move closer to the structure and patterns of the conventional 
MNEs, displaying similar ownership advantages, managerial skills, organisational structures and 
so forth.   
As globalisation has increased the role of inward FDI in many developing countries, this 
has changed their L advantages, and not surprisingly, the O advantages of domestic firms. In 
certain instances, their O advantages have been eroded and have been crowded-out, while in 
other cases, firms have benefitted from the competition effect, as well as through spillovers and 
linkages. 
 
13 
***Table 2 about here *** 
*** Figure 1 about here*** 
 
4. The evidence on DC MNEs: Does the data indicate a change in trends? 
 
In this section we shall examine whether, and to what extent, the significance and pattern of DC 
MNE activity has changed in both relative and absolute terms since the 1980s. Ideally, this 
would require proper benchmark studies across countries, but such data is rarely available. A 
number of studies have been based on case analysis of a firm or certain groups of firms with 
specific nationalities. Although they provide plenty of detail, they have the disadvantage of a 
selection bias, and it is not always clear whether these findings can be extrapolated as being 
representative of their home economies. On the other hand, FDI data gives a better picture of 
trends at the country-level, and to what extent some home countries are able to propagate firms 
with the capacity to engage in international activities, and how these have changed over time. 
Nonetheless, as we explain in Box 2, there are also significant limitations to the use of FDI data.  
A number of studies point to the rapid growth of developing country FDI stocks as a 
percentage of total outward stock from 9.8 per cent to 14.7 per cent between 1993 and 2007, as 
evidence of the increasing importance of these countries as sources of outward FDI. This data is 
summarised in Figure 1 and Table 2. We proceed in Figure 1 (for raw data, see Table 2) to adjust 
the stock figures for the BRICS countries, which seem to have a monotonic effect on the graph, 
with an increase from 7.2 per cent to 11.39 per cent over 15 years.  When we extract the Asian 
NICs, however, we see a sudden drop in the outward FDI stock as a share of total world FDI 
stock, such that there seems little or no change in the trend over the period from 6.4 per cent to 
6.97 per cent over the same period. As these data are nominal, and undeflated, this implies a 
decline in real terms over time once Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore are 
eliminated. If one eliminates the NICs, BRICS (in other words, 9 countries), the percentage of 
outward FDI from developing countries actually declines even in nominal terms, from 3.0 per 
cent to 2.4 per cent between 1993 and 2007. This does not reflect, then, a broad-based 
phenomenon, but the case of a rather small group of countries. Indeed, once we eliminate 
outward FDI stock from NICs, BRICs, GCC6 and tax havens, outward FDI stocks from 
                                                 
6
 The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are the main oil exporting countries of the Middle East. We 
use the term GCC and Middle East Oil Exporting Countries as synonyms in this paper. 
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developing countries fell from 2.05 per cent or total to 0.44 per cent of the total between 1993 
and 2007. This data suggests that most of– if not all - the growth in outward MNE activity from 
‘developing countries’ comes from a group of countries that are for all intents and purposes 
developed7, and have been so, since the beginning of the new millennium.  
 
 
 
*** Table 3 about here*** 
 
 
Table 3 gives details of the outward FDI stock of the 20 largest home countries amongst 
the developing countries for 4 periods 1993, 2000 and 2007. The first thing worth noting is that 
there are no new countries in the list of the top 20 home countries (which excludes the Middle 
East oil exporting economies, and tax havens). These 20 countries accounted for 8.6 per cent of 
total outward FDI in 1993, and in 2007 these same countries accounted for 14.12 per cent. As a 
                                                 
7
 Indeed, the continued inclusion of the Asian NICs in the classification of developing countries seems somewhat 
strange and even problematic, given that the GDP level on a per capita basis (whether on a PPP or nominal basis) 
have clearly converged with the developed world. 
Box 2: The superiority of FDI stocks as a measure of MNE activity 
There is a widespread tendency to use on the volume of FDI flows, as this is often the only 
data available, and gives an idea of capital provided from foreign sources.  For the purposes 
of estimating the value of foreign-owned economic activity in a given economy, however, it is 
much better to use stock data. Flow data are estimated by the central banks for balance of 
payments purposes and only indicate the amount of new investments coming into a host 
economy in a given year, and take no account of reinvested earnings, capital raised in the 
domestic capital markets, transferred between subsidiaries in the same host location, or 
disinvestments (if the capital remains in the host country). For purposes of accuracy then, the 
appropriate unit of analysis should be FDI stocks. FDI stock data gives a more accurate idea 
of the contribution an MNE makes to the host economy, and has a monotonic relationship to 
its local value-adding activities. It also provides a better measure of how this significance 
changes over time, and by taking into account previous investments, it allows us to compare 
the relative importance of MNEs between countries.  
Where FDI stocks are not available, international agencies such as UNCTAD estimate stocks 
by taking a accumulated of flows for a certain number of years as a rough proxy. Although 
such estimations are not always perfect, they still provide a better estimate of changing trends 
in the value of MNE activities. For a discussion, see Narula (1996, pp 42-44), Zhan, J. (2006) 
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percentage of outward FDI from the developing countries as a whole, this Figure is 87.9 per cent 
and 96.3 per cent respectively for the same years.  
 Table 3 also lists the level of outward FDI stock on a per capita basis.  Despite the 
considerable focus on the growth of outward FDI from India, its outward FDI stock on a per 
capita basis remains the lowest of the 20 countries in all three periods, having increased from just 
US$0.3 to US$25.1 over the 14 year period, and even in 2007 was less than countries such as 
Philippines and Indonesia, and a third that of China, and is even lower than Nigeria and 
Colombia.  The data for the BRICS countries in general indicate that Brazil and South Africa 
were already major outward investors in 1993, and indeed may have declined in relative terms 
over time. It would seem, therefore, that the case of China and Russia were the only significant 
new entrants over this period. Consider also that Russia presents a special case, having moved 
from being a political superpower, with a strong military-industrial complex to an ‘emerging 
economy’. Indeed, several indicators of technical and scientific indicators in the 1980s make it 
difficult to argue the case that Russia’s development can usefully be compared with other so-
called emerging economies, and continues to possess elements of a knowledge infrastructure 
which is very much ‘world class’ (Narula and Jormanainen 2008), but have not fully made an 
effective transition that allow these assets to be efficiently exploited within a capitalist 
framework. 
Indeed, the data in Table 3 indicates that the analyses conducted more than 10 years ago 
of the outward FDI activity from developing countries continues to be relevant: it shows that 
growth in outward MNE activity has primarily been with a very small group of countries, the 
majority of whom that are at a level of development consistent with the predictions of the 
investment development path (Dunning 1981, Dunning and Narula 1996, Narula and Dunning 
2000, 2010). These are countries that have a certain threshold level of economic development, 
and would be classified as late stage 2 and stage 3, and whose home locations have an 
appropriate level of location advantages that are ordinarily associated with competitive 
advantages of domestic firms of the levels that could support sustainable growth of outward FDI.   
 
*** Table 4 about here*** 
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Earlier studies have shown that there is a clear association with level of economic 
development of a given country and the propensity of its firms to engage in outward FDI (See 
Narula and Dunning 2010 for a review). Thus, we are able to test whether outward FDI has been 
growing faster or slower than economic development for groups of countries at roughly the same 
stage of development, and between groups. In other words, we can see if the developing 
countries (and within developing countries, which sub-groups) have a more rapid growth in their 
outward FDI activity. We utilise GDP per capita as a crude indicator of economic development, 
Table 4 shows that although GDP per capita of the least developed countries has grown more 
rapidly during the first 7 years of the new millennium, it has increased at a faster rate for the low-
middle income and upper middle income countries. This suggests that economic convergence 
has not grown, although the data would suggest that divergence, at least, is no longer the case, 
with the ratio of GDP per capita for low income to high income countries having increased 
marginally from 1.3 per cent to 1.6 per cent between 1993 and 2007 (Table 4).  
Turning to the same ratio for outward FDI per capita, there has been no increase in 
outward FDI from the least developed countries between 1993 and 2007, with an noticeable (and 
statistically significant) increase for upper middle income countries in relative terms (Table 4).  
Indeed, turning to the BRICS countries, they increased from 1 per cent to 1.3 per cent, hardly a 
large increase at all. In comparison, the NICs outward FDI increased from 55.4 per cent to 
121 per cent over the same time period.  This confirms that outward FDI is not increasing rapidly 
from developing countries as a whole, and is largely associated with countries at a relative high 
level of development. In other words, it has been growing faster with upper middle income 
countries and less so in lower-middle income countries.  
 
*** Table 5 about here*** 
 
Although comparable data on the industrial composition of outward FDI are somewhat 
scarce, Table 5 gives some idea for Brazil, Russia, India and China, the BRICs countries show 
considerable heterogeneity. China invests less than 10 per cent of its total outward FDI abroad in 
the manufacturing sector (Table 5). This compares with the case of Brazil which invests less 
3 per cent. India, and Russia, by contrast, seem to invest roughly 50 per cent in the secondary 
sector. Indeed, all four countries have a large interest in FDI in the tertiary sector, with Brazil 
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investing 96.8 per cent of total outward FDI stock in services, compared with 65 per cent for 
China, 51 per cent for Russia and just 37 per cent for India. Table 6 gives us a clear idea that a 
majority of the outward FDI from the BRICS countries is of a regional nature.  
 
*** Table 6 about here*** 
 
 
5. Sustainable outward FDI: not all ownership advantages are equal.  
Certain assets are country- or location-specific in nature: these derive inter alia from privileged 
or monopolistic access to natural resources; a monopoly/oligopoly granted by government 
policy; subsidies provided, sometimes in the form of low-cost loans. With the exception of 
capital subsidies specifically for the purposes of outward FDI, privileged access to the home 
market only provides an initial advantage to venture abroad (Rugman 2008). The 
initial advantage is generated indirectly, in that even where unit costs of activities abroad are 
greater than competitors in the host market, economic rents generated from the monopolistic 
position at home can cross-subsidise foreign operations. A number of Chinese outward MNEs 
have the advantage of being state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Ding 2000, Buckley et al 2007, 
Huang 2008) which allows them to generate a lower rate of return on their foreign activities.  
A number of the home countries of DC MNEs are part of a subset of developing 
countries that have utilised - to different degrees - a combination of import-substituting policies 
with outward export orientation (see e.g. Lall 1996, Amsden 2001). They have all enjoyed 
government patronage and support, either as national champions or as members of privileged 
oligopolies, with access to government contracts, subsidies, trade and investment barriers to 
foreign competitors, and the careful and leveraged use of local content, lax property right 
regimes, and technology transfer agreements that enabled them to grow strong in protected 
domestic markets. Many began their international expansion with active government support, 
were able to cross-subsidise their monopoly profits at home against the cost of international 
expansion, or were proactive in overseas expansion because of home country liberalisation and 
the consequent end to their protected home markets. They are not entrepreneurial start-ups that 
began to compete internationally based entirely on their own merits. This is especially so in the 
case of Indian MNEs, such as Mittal, Tata, Reliance and Birla, but was also the case in other 
MNEs from developing countries (such as those from Thailand, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
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Kong, China and Malaysia). They benefitted from the import-substitution era where oligopolistic 
profits were permitted to a few ‘national champions’ (entry and exit in any given industry were 
controlled by the state, which only licensed a few select firms).  
Such expansion provides an initial basis for expansion, and is not sustainable in the long 
run, unless other existing asset- or transaction-type firm-specific advantages are augmented or 
new ones developed or acquired (Ramamurti 2008a, Pananond 2007). However, augmenting or 
acquiring ownership advantages is not costless, nor is it always feasible. I will discuss this in 
greater detail in section 4.2, which focuses on strategic asset-augmenting activities. 
 This is not to distract from the fact that a number of these companies have succeeded in 
upgrading their ownership advantages and no longer dependent on captive markets, large capital 
bases, and discounted interest rates, or the advantages that derive there from. But it is important 
to remember that these are the firms that have thus far survived their international expansion 
reflects a selection bias. It does not necessarily imply either, that their expansion strategies will 
necessarily continue unabated, having, in many cases, little or no prior experience in 
coordinating and controlling cross-border integrated operations. It is not yet clear whether on 
average they have scaled back further than large conventional firms, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there are few new entrants, and that their failure rate is no lower than firms in 
general.  
Indeed, there is a trend for MNEs to seek greater economies of scope and scale by 
creating greater integration wherever possible. However, this varies by industry, reflecting 
opportunities to seek rationalisation of activities such that regional or global scale economies are 
achieved and duplication reduced, while still maintaining some level of local responsiveness. 
Greater competition has forced almost all cross-border operators to seek greater integration to 
achieve lower costs.  
Many of these firms are amongst the largest in their home markets, and are themselves 
part of large industrial groups (sometimes with cross-holdings and common ownership) with 
interests in several industries, and also derive location-specific ownership advantages from 
privileged access to intra-group transactions and intermediate goods within the same family of 
firms, but these advantages are not necessarily available when they move abroad.  However, 
where other members of the same domestic networks (even in the absence of formal ties) have 
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international operations, their knowledge and competences of foreign activities positively 
influence internationalisation (Yiu et al 2007, Elango and Pattnaik 2007). 
Another initiaL advantage (and not necessarily location-specific) derives from close 
relationships with governments in their home countries. This works at two levels. First, by virtue 
of their size and importance in the home economy, they have close relationships with state-
owned organisations, ministries and policy makers, and are able to influence domestic policy, as 
well as the associated technology and science infrastructure to their own needs, and in many 
cases, these have evolved around and with their own domestic activities, often over a long period 
of time. Such linkages confer the basis to generate economic rent for incumbents, and are a cost 
to new entrants or those less entrenched in the domestic milieu. These advantages are not 
transferable to foreign markets, and establishing ‘membership’ in business and innovation 
networks in new locations is not costless (Narula 2002). At the same time, not all DC MNEs 
have privileged access to these networks, particularly those that are smaller, and/or start-ups. For 
such firms, outward FDI may also be a means to exit institutional constraints at home (Witt and 
Lewin 2007)8 and access technological resources associated with innovation systems elsewhere 
which have not been captured by the larger and more dominant national champions (Narula and 
Zanfei 2005).  
Second, many countries have now established – directly or indirectly, policies that 
promote outward FDI (Giroud et al 2009, Fortanier and van Tulder 2009, Kumar and Chadha 
2009). Some home countries provide fiscal incentives such as low cost loans either to the MNE, 
to the host country, or to both (such as for resource-seeking investments in the case of China), 
while other home countries make political interventions on behalf of the investing firm. 
Although this is a tactic that has been utilised for centuries to gain trade and investment 
concessions, and access to restricted sectors of the host economy, it has hitherto been a policy 
followed by first-world home countries and MNEs (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009).  
Several commentators have noted that a considerable amount of outward FDI from 
developing countries is actually ‘round-trip’ FDI, which is outward FDI by firms seeking to 
reinvest these same funds in the home country as inward FDI, which attracts specific incentives 
and subsidies not always available to domestic firms (Huang 2008). This behaviour has been 
                                                 
8
 Child and Rodriguez 2005 have noted that Chinese firms may pursue outward FDI as a means to minimise 
disadvantages of having a purely domestic footprint.  
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particularly noted for Chinese firms investing in Hong Kong and some tax haven countries such 
as Cayman Islands, Virgin Islands, etc. These three regions were the destination of over 75 per 
cent of outward FDI flows from China from 2003 and 2006, although the ultimate beneficiaries 
of these investments are hard to determine (Morck et al 2008). Earlier estimates suggest that 
round-tripping of foreign direct investment could account for about 25 to 30 per cent of inward 
FDI in China (Harold and Lall, 1993; World Bank, 2002)9.  
One of the reasons many developing countries discouraged outward FDI prior to 
liberalisation was that outward activity represented an excuse for capital flight. This motivation 
cannot be discounted. Morck et al (2008) note that this remains an important reason for Chinese 
some percentage of Chinese outward investment. In the case of Russia, high levels of political 
and economic uncertainty as well as considerable regulatory constraints after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union resulted in considerable capital flight (Kalotay 2002) 
 Of course, the pendulum has swung the other way: the same domestic firms vilified by 
their home governments for capital flight 20 years ago, are now seen as symbols of national 
virility. Thus, it is worth highlighting the importance of ‘hubris’ as a (unsustainable) motivation 
for outward FDI by DC MNEs, both of the owners, as well as of the home country governments. 
Ramamurti (2008b) notes China’s explicit intention to have 50 Chinese firms amongst the 
Fortune 500 by 2010. India’s government has likewise begun to promote its large firms’ foreign 
investments. Bharti Telecom attempted to merge with MTN of South Africa in 2008, but when it 
transpired that their relative size and international experience would mean that MTN would de 
facto be acquiring Bharti, its CEO withdrew from the merger citing national pride10. Indeed, 
being a multinational firm with an overseas presence is often seen by management of companies 
as a symbol of success. However, it is one thing to acquire such assets, it is quite another to 
integrate and manage them successfully, and reap the benefit of the economies of common 
governance. Tata’s acquisition of both Tetley’s and Jaguar Land Rover have both been loosely 
integrated (if at all) with the Tata’s other operations either at home or elsewhere.  Where such 
firms have sought to integrate more deeply, the lack of experience in managing cross-border 
activities is reflected in their failure to reap scale economies. This is not novel to DC MNEs: 
                                                 
9
 Table 6 shows that some 70 per cent of Brazil’s outward FDI stock is directed towards these countries, although 
the evidence is less clear as to whether this is for tax purposes rather than round-tripping. 
10
 ‘“Bharti’s vision of transforming itself from a homegrown Indian company to a true Indian multinational telecom 
giant, symbolizing the pride of India, would have been severely compromised.” The situation was “completely 
unacceptable,” Bharti said.’  Source: New York Times, May 24 2008, ‘$50 Billion Bharti-MTN Deal Falls Apart’ 
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acquisitions rather than greenfield activities have the advantage of rapidity, but require greater 
ownership advantages to maintain. On the other hand, acquired assets are easier to divest since 
they continue to have a resale value, should the firm wish to sell because it has decide to change 
it strategic direction, or its earlier enthusiasm may have waned (Athreye and Kapur 2009).  
 
 
 
Box 3: Outward investment does not imply that the investing firm is an MNE 
Foreign direct investment differs from portfolio investment in the fundamental importance of 
control by the investing firm: the investor’s aim is not simply to generate an adequate return 
on their capital, but to engage in the management of the foreign subsidiary, actively 
determining its strategy and subsequent implementation. The basis for this control is 
presumed to be the possession of some kind of ownership advantage, which may be 
entrepreneurial, managerial or technological.  Where a firm is an acquisition, the acquiring 
firm is presumed to have such an ownership advantage relative to the firm it is acquiring: 
ownership level being equal, it is presumed that the firm that controls the joint venture must 
possess some superior assets.  
In the days of capital controls, ownership implied control: .most statistical offices have 
continued to classify projects as FDI based simply on the share of ownership. Most countries 
take the benchmark of 50 per cent or greater as an indicator that the firm is controlled by a 
foreign-owned firm, while in other instances (as in the case of inward FDI into the US), 
10 per cent ownership implies all the assets of the acquired firm are foreign-controlled.  
Almost all host countries evaluated FDI projects on an individual basis to confirm the 
intention of the investment, and the kinds of effects it might have on the host economy, as 
well as the kinds of assets it planned to utilise. 
This is no longer as easily done, nor do countries seek to restrict foreign investment flows, 
having in most cases agreed to WTO regulations that guarantee national treatment to foreign 
investors.  
It should not always be presumed, therefore, that a foreign investment is necessarily a foreign 
direct investment. It may represent an institutional investment – through for instance, a 
private equity firm, or a portfolio investment. This is the case in many of the acquisitions by 
oil exporting countries (including the Middle East countries, but also Russia) where 
individuals or (state-owned, or influenced) firms have access to capital and acquire ownership 
in companies which give them the potential to exert control.   
The acquisition of dominant share in a foreign-based enterprise may be undertaken because it 
provides superior oversight and reduces the costs of shirking compared to non-equity modes 
of cooperation or a minority equity share. Thus firms may overvalue the benefits of having a 
dominant, majority or wholly-owned foreign affiliate, because the investor’s home country 
does not provide it the experience of trusting other modes of entry share. Morck et al (2008) 
argue that this is the case with many Chinese firms. Such investments are de jure FDI, but de 
facto portfolio investments.  
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6. DC MNEs and acquisition of ‘strategic’ assets 
There is considerable ambiguity as to what constitutes strategic asset-seeking investment. This 
has led to a variety of activities being classified as asset-seeking, and I want to revisit the logic 
underlying this motivation before discussing its importance for DC MNEs.  
To an extent, all investments – whatever the mode of entry, whether portfolio or direct, 
equity or non-equity – have a strategic aspect. ‘Strategic’ activity by a firm implies actions that 
have the potential to improve their long-term (i.e. future) product and/or market positioning, and 
by implication and design, the firm’s profitability in future periods. To fully understand the 
ambiguity of referring to specific activities as ‘strategic’, consider whether any investment or 
activity undertaken can explicitly be described as non-strategic. Activities can be either more 
strategic, or less so, but all actions have implications for the long term, and only takes on 
meaning when we regard strategic as having an orthogonal relationship with transaction cost 
minimising behaviour.  In other words, firms that undertake activities that are considered to be 
strategic imply that they may not necessarily be activities that generate immediate economic 
rents, but are expected to do so in future periods.  
It is possible (and likely) that most kinds of activities are strategic in this sense. Firms 
may seek to acquire assets by M&A which are strategic for their long term well-being, say 
extractive rights (as for instance Chinese firms are increasingly doing in Africa or Latin 
America), and can therefore be both strategic and resource-seeking simultaneously. Other firms 
may engage in an M&A in an important market abroad to acquire distribution channels, and this 
too would be both strategic and market-seeking.  However, having multiple motives is one thing, 
and activities that have a long-term potential for firm-growth are quite different, which is the 
primary sense as originally implied by Dunning (1993) and others in introducing the term 
‘strategic asset-seeking’ or ‘strategic asset-augmenting’ as a separate and distinct motivation. 
Where firms engage in strategic asset-seeking activity, they are explicitly (and primarily) seeking 
learning opportunities, rather than seeking to invest for strategic purposes in specific assets. Not 
all types of outward MNE activity necessarily imply significant learning opportunities for the 
home-based operations of the MNE. In the case of natural resource-seeking investments for 
instance, they rarely represent channels for reverse technology transfer.  It is worth noting that 
there is considerable FDI by DC firms in sectors where firms by necessity require a physical 
foreign presence, particularly in service based industries. Some of these investments are 
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‘strategic’ in the sense that banks and insurance companies need to maintain overseas operations 
in financial centers such as New York and London, and be capitalized or at least be registered as 
having a legal presence in those locations. Yet others require a physical presence to be in 
proximity to clients. Such investments are both market-seeking and resource-seeking and while 
knowledge acquired from such operations helps improve best practice, the extent to which they 
benefit home-country operations depends upon the extent to which the MNE itself seeks to 
evolve into a global integrated enterprise, or maintain its foreign operations as de facto free-
standing enterprises with weak links to the parent company.  
Let us therefore define strategic asset-augmenting activities here very clearly as those 
which are intended primarily to create opportunities that enhance their firm-specific competitive 
assets.  If this is so, it is not entirely clear whether such firms are able to internalise and 
efficiently utilise such knowledge acquired to generate sustainable Ownership advantages that 
can be exploited elsewhere, particularly where they do not possess the necessary complementary 
assets to do so. Asset-seeking activities imply the active augmentation of existing ownership 
advantages through, inter alia, R&D (Dunning 1993), or through cooperative agreements. It is 
for this reason that a number of authors (e.g, Kuemmerle 1996, Narula and Zanfei 2005, 
Criscuolo et al 2005) prefer the term asset-augmenting activity to describe activities whose 
primary purpose is the generation of new knowledge which augments existing competences, 
whether this be through their own (formal) R&D activities, or through other non-hierarchical 
means in partnership with other economic actors.  
 Thus, while surveys (e.g. UNCTAD 2006) and research publications (e.g. Mathews 2002, 
2006) continue to suggest a growing amount of strategic asset-seeking FDI by DC MNEs, not all 
of this is ‘strategic’ in a strict sense, since it may have no direct impact on the firm-specific asset 
of these firms.  
 
7. How does outward MNE activity matter for home country development? 
 
It seems reasonable to argue that since there is considerable research indicating the nature of the 
relationship between inward MNE activity and host country development (see Narula and 
Dunning 2010 for a review), the same principles should be mirrored in outward MNE activity 
and home country development. Broadly speaking, beyond direct impact on balance of 
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payments, employment and capital flows, etc, the real importance of inward MNE activity is 
associated with opportunities for learning by domestic economic actors in the host economy due 
to externalities. By extension, therefore, we would expect that outward MNE activity has the 
potential to create learning opportunities for the home country. 
However, even with inward FDI, the link with development remains an indirect one: 
Where inward MNE activity results in positive externalities, and when domestic firms have the 
capacity to usefully internalize these externalities, and if the non-firm sector supports domestic 
capacity building, there will be industrial development (Narula and Dunning 2010).  The primary 
development effect derives from opportunities to improve the location advantages of the host 
location, as well as the ownership advantages of the domestic firms.  Learning in general 
requires proximity: while codified aspects of knowledge can be transferred in arms-length 
transactions and across distances, (in the forms of blueprints, manuals, books) as well as 
embodied in equipment. Such knowledge is explicit as it is possible to codify, standardise and 
record, and is thus easier to diffuse. Knowledge that is not explicit is often tacit. Tacit knowledge 
refers to intuitive knowledge that is based on based on experience. Tacit knowledge is thus 
context specific and restricted to the economic actors who control it. Moreover, it is created 
though experience based learning processes such as learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962) and 
learning-by-using (Rosenberg 1982). Tacit knowledge is a prerequisite to understand and use 
codified knowledge, while itself possible to obtain unaided by codified knowledge (Polanyi 
1969). Nevertheless, the partition between the two kinds of knowledge is not always obvious; 
rather they are mutually dependent, giving economic knowledge the character of being 
compound by both tacit and explicit elements (Lundvall and Johnson 1994, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995, Cowan, David and Foray 2000, Lam, 2000). It is best communicated in face-to-
face interaction between people and that a social context is essential for constructive knowledge 
diffusion by way of learning-by-interaction. Interactive learning is used to communicate 
knowledge amongst firms and between firms and other relevant actors that may serve as 
knowledge suppliers to an innovation system. A typical example of this is the so-called user-
producer relationships, which are vertical linkages of relatively close interactive learning 
associations between users and producers in different fractions of the value chain.  
This tacit nature implies that even where knowledge is available through markets, it still needs 
to be modified to be efficiently integrated within the acquiring firm’s portfolio of technologies. 
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In addition, the tacit nature of knowledge associated with production and innovation activity in 
these sectors implies that “physical” or geographical proximity is important for transmitting it 
(Blanc and Sierra, 1999). While the marginal cost of transmitting codified knowledge across 
geographic space does not depend on distance, the marginal cost of transmitting tacit knowledge 
increases with distance. This leads to the clustering of innovation activities, in particular at the 
early stage of an industry life cycle where tacit knowledge plays an important role (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996). Thus, knowledge spillovers tend to be more intense between parties that are 
located close to each other in space. Various explanations have been offered for this finding, 
such as the tacit nature of knowledge (as discussed above), but also the existence of spillovers 
due to a common pool of resources in a region (e.g. skilled labour, educational institute or 
specific scientific equipment). In other words, proximity is an important basis for transferring 
knowledge, whether this transfer is undertaken intentionally (due to formal vertical or horizontal 
linkages), or unintentionally (e.g. because of imitation by rivals). 
In the case of outward MNE activity, the link is more tenuous, there is automatically a 
question of distance between the source of the spillovers and the beneficiaries. It also presumes 
close, regular and intentional knowledge links between the foreign subsidiary and the parent 
firm.  Lastly, it presumes that knowledge flows are reversed from their traditional direction, and 
this change of net direction is systematically utilized. i.e. flows from the parent to the subsidiary 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those between foreign subsidiary to the parent. This 
is a phenomenon that is known as reverse technology transfer (e.g. Håkanson & Nobel Nobel, 
2001, Håkanson & Nobel, 2000, Frost and Zhou. 2005). In addition, it also presumes that there 
are strong linkages and associated knowledge flows from the parent located in the home country 
and the innovation system in the home location. An empirical study by Potterlberghe and 
Lichtenberg (2001) finds evidence in favour of the idea that outward FDI contributes to 
increasing the home country productivity. However, further evidence remains sparse. 
The link is even more tenuous between outward FDI and home country learning 
opportunities developing countries for at least five reasons. First, knowledge flows – even by 
developed country firms- tend to primarily exploit the ownership advantages of the parent, in 
what is conventional knowledge transfer, with relatively little (and often minor) knowledge 
flowing in the opposite direction.  Indeed, upwards of 90 per cent of MNE activity is considered 
to be home-base asset-exploiting. Second, knowledge flows require systematic linkages between 
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the parent and the foreign subsidiary. Not all foreign subsidiaries are closely linked with the 
parent, and this depends on a number of internal organisational factors. The subsidiary may have 
evolved independently of the parent firm (either because the subsidiary is an acquisition, or 
because the MNE’s strategy is based on a ‘federal’ model of freestanding and largely 
autonomous country affiliates, as may also be expected with a firm that engages in a multi-
domestic strategy). As a result, some multinationals tend to be organised as a loosely coupled 
network of relatively autonomous subsidiaries, each with its own strategic goals and activities 
(Astley and Zajac 1990, Birkinshaw 2002). This may simply reflect their strategic importance as 
well. A subsidiary which primarily functions as a sales office to process exports is unlikely to be 
deeply integrated with the parent. Even where sales might be high, such an operation may have 
little to contribute in terms of knowledge flows. Third, reverse technology transfer implies strong 
and consistent interdependencies with the innovation systems and a high level of embeddedness 
with economic actors and institutions at home. However, in many developing countries, the 
innovation system is under developed, and these MNEs have expanded internationally precisely 
because they wish to reduce their dependence on the home country innovation system. Fourth, 
managing complex cross-border knowledge flows requires very particular organisational 
capabilities of firms, and these are O advantages that only a small handful of MNEs possess 
(Criscuolo and Narula 2008). Fifth, much of outward FDI by DC MNEs tends to be natural 
resource seeking or trade-supportive, which generate few opportunities for systematic learning. 
A number of researchers have suggested that DC MNEs are increasingly engaging in a 
strategic asset-seeking FDI, where the primary aim is to explicitly acquire new competences. 
That is, the primary goal is to boost the firm’s ownership advantages. But it is essential to 
highlight a very fundamental condition for such activity: firms must have existing ownership 
advantages to augment, or initial ownership advantages with which they can barter or exchange. 
Furthermore, firms require some level of in-house expertise in the field, if they are to 
successfully utilise the acquired knowledge because information is often-context-specific.  Thus, 
MNEs with greater initial ownership advantages have a greater absorptive capacity to be able to 
extract and utilise the potential for new innovation to be found in locations.  Many firms have 
been very successful in upgrading their O advantages through such means. However, the 
improvement of a firm’s ownership advantages does not automatically imply that there will be 
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consequent improvements in the location advantages of its home country.  We will discuss this at 
greater length in the next section. 
 
7.1. What conditions allow home countries to benefit from outward MNE activity? 
The discussion on the benefits of outward MNE activity on the host country can be classified 
within three areas: 
1. Balance of payments effects 
2. employment effects 
3. learning and technological effects 
By and large, the benefits from outward MNE activity are hinged upon the opportunities to 
upgrade the L advantages of the home country, and we will concentrate on the last of these three. 
However, this is contingent upon a complete chain of events and three very specific sets of 
interactions, which are depicted in Figure 2: 
1. Outward FDI activity needs to result in a systematic and non-negligible upgrading of the 
O advantages of the foreign affiliate. This presumes that the O advantages of the affiliate 
are sustainable, and that it possesses the initial assets which will allow them to effectively 
absorb the spillovers through linkages with the innovation system of the host location; 
2. the organisation structure of the DC MNE must be sufficiently sophisticated (in other 
words, highly integrated across borders) to allow for the transmission of these new and 
augmented assets by reverse technology transfer to the parent firm in the home country; 
3. the parent firm must be sufficiently integrated with local actors in the home country, such 
that these augmented technologies are available to them, and that they have the necessary 
absorptive capacity to efficiently utilise these assets. 
 
*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In short, the upgrading of location advantages of the home country presumes considerable 
absorptive capabilities of the MNE subsidiary, high managerial and organisational capabilities of 
the MNE such that they are able to exploit economies of common governance, and high 
absorptive capabilities of the home country.  
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It is well-known that the O advantages of firms are a function of the L advantages of the 
home country, and that significant levels of outward FDI activity are normally also associated 
with such well-developed country-specific business and innovation systems (Narula and 
Dunning 2010). Just as with inward FDI, countries lagging too far behind are not able to 
efficiently interpret and internalise technology, whether its source is trade-related or FDI-related. 
The existence of threshold level effects has been reported in empirical analysis on inward FDI 
and trade related R&D spillovers (Girma 2005, Fu 2008, Borenzstein et al. 1998, Xu 2000), all 
of which show that FDI has a positive impact on developing countries and regions within those 
countries that have attained a certain minimum level of absorptive capacity. In a similar vein, the 
work of Rasiah (2002) points to the fact that up to the threshold level of absorptive capacity, 
basic infrastructure is more important, but progress towards more technology-intensive 
manufacturing activities depends on the existence of ‘high tech infrastructure’. Indeed, Criscuolo 
and Narula (2008) argue, national absorptive capacity requires a system-wide view of the 
economy. The complex chain of relationships and interdependencies that this implies are mapped 
pout in Figure 3.  
 
*** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
It is worth noting that high levels of absorptive capacity do not always imply equal 
benefits of absorbing technologies at all stages. The cost of imitation increases as the follower 
closes the gap with the leader and the number of technologies to be imitated reduces. That is, the 
amount of knowledge readily available that the follower country can exploit is smaller, because 
most of it has already been imitated, and the residue is more complex, having a higher level of 
tacitness. Once a country is near the international best-practice a higher level of uncertainty is 
involved, and it is complicated to identify what is relevant, how to solve problems related to the 
exploitation of new technology: the task difficulty and the knowledge complexity rapidly 
increases (Criscuolo and Narula 2008). 
Threshold levels of L advantages that are associated with threshold levels at which 
inward FDI has positive growth effects on host economies, and are also a necessary condition for 
which outward FDI can be effectively internalized by the home country – should the MNE have 
the capability and intention to transfer these to their home location.  This fits the arguments 
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proposed by the investment development path that outward FDI from developing countries is 
systematically related to inward MNE activity, and that outward MNE activity is often associated 
with a high level of inward MNE activity, since they are both a function of the quality of the 
L advantages of the economy in question (Narula and Dunning, 2000, 2010)11. As Nayyar (2008) 
notes in the case of India, Outward FDI is dominated by firms which have considerable 
technological capabilities which they have developed over a long term. Table 7 gives some 
indicators of the technological and absorptive capacities of the most important DC home 
countries, and helps makes this point. 
 
8. Implications of DC MNE activity for developing host countries  
What are the implications for developing country host countries from developing country 
MNEs? There is no strong evidence that DC MNEs have a specific interest in South-South 
activities, although relatively speaking, some DC MNEs have invested quite a considerable 
amount of FDI in the developing world. However, again, this tends to be from a small group of 
countries, and indicates a strong regional character, reminiscent of the first wave (Table 1). That 
is, it tends to be either resource-seeking or trade-supportive FDI. It is sometimes market-seeking, 
but often in sectors where specific characteristics of the products and services are especially 
suited for countries with similar conditions.   
The similarity of conditions has been much commented upon the literature. More 
recently, Aulakh (2007) and others point to knowledge of operating in similar institutional 
conditions which are predominated by complex, informal institutions which create greater 
uncertainty, or as Khanna and Palepu (2006) put it, institutional ‘voids’. That is, developing 
country MNEs – such as those from China, India and South Africa - are able to discount the 
greater risk of operating in such environments because they have more experience – either at 
home or in other similar countries – which provides them a location-specific O advantages not 
necessarily available to investors from developed countries. Del Sol and Kogan (2007) point to 
the ownership advantages that Chilean MNEs have in ‘liberalisation know-how’. Chile 
underwent liberalisation much earlier than other Latin American countries, and firms were able 
to leverage this knowledge in other regional markets.   
                                                 
11
 Liu et al (2005) find that outward FDI is not related to inward FDI in the case of China, perhaps pointing to the 
possibility that at least some of Chinese outward FDI has the characteristics of portfolio investment. 
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Do DC MNEs contribute more or less than developed country MNEs to developing host 
economies? The data on this subject is mute, although there is some suggestion that South-South 
FDI has advantages because technologies used are ‘more appropriate’. This argument is not a 
new one – indeed, this was proposed originally in earlier studies (see White 1981) - although 
later studies showed that DC MNEs used similar equipment, production processes, and products 
as developed country firms (Lall 1983, Narula 1997).  
Indeed, on the surface, it is hard to argue that DC MNE firms provide more benefits. In 
Africa, DC MNEs tend to be smaller, have smaller local subsidiaries, employ fewer workers, pay 
lower wages, provide less training to workers, use more expatriates, less skilled local workers, 
and use less local content (and import more imported inputs) (UNIDO 2007).  
The UNIDO survey does indicate that investors from the developing world have larger 
investment plans in Africa for the future than their Northern counterparts, but this may also 
reflect the fact that conventional MNEs have been established for a longer period of time, and 
have fewer opportunity for growth. Overall, DC MNEs may indeed represent a new (and 
growing) source of capital, but it is less clear that it represents a new source of technology, or 
that they engage in activities that have greater opportunities for positive externalities.   
It is our contention in this paper – and confirmed by the UNIDO (2007) survey for the 
case of Africa, that there is no (or no longer a) clear North-South difference in terms of MNE 
subsidiaries and their related benefits as DC MNEs move inexorably towards management and 
organisational structures and strategies that are no different from conventional MNEs, except 
insofar as it reflects international experience and size. The UNIDO survey concludes that it is 
best to examine foreign investment along the following categorization (UNIDO 2007: 130):  
1. Large, old, MNE subsidiaries – most of which are from the developed countries, and 
were established prior to liberalisation. These often have historical and colonial links. 
They tend to be capital intensive, and have expanded regionally. 
2. Global/regional exporter subsidiaries – these are relatively new post-liberalisation MNE 
subsidiaries, often DC MNEs. They tend to be smaller MNEs which are concentrated in 
low value manufacturing sectors, and are focused on export markets such as garments, 
agricultural products and textiles.  
3. Free-standing foreign-owned companies that have no clear association with a foreign 
‘parent’.  
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Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) point to a slightly different categorisation for Chinese 
investments. They suggest three groups. The first are the state-owned firms, which are indeed 
controlled and coordinated by parent firms based in China, and to varying extents respond to and 
act in accordance with the policies of Chinese state.  They fit our understanding of what is FDI 
and these firms can certainly be considered to be DC MNEs in the sense intended (see discussion 
in Box 3).  
The second group are private firms incorporated in China. The third are firms owned by 
Chinese citizens who have emigrated to Africa. These two groups are best described as ‘free-
standing foreign-owned firms’. That is, there is little or no systematic association with a ‘parent 
company’ in the nominal home country. Such firms are, for all intents and purposes, domestic 
firms that happen to be owned by nationals of a foreign country (Gu 2009). From a development 
perspective, these two groups are not very different to their domestic counterparts and may 
provide fewer opportunities for spillovers and linkages to the domestic economy than de facto 
FDI, or even domestic investors12. They tend to be relatively small in scale and in the services 
sector, or are engaged in trading activities. Their impact in terms of capital, linkages and 
spillovers is relatively minor. However, in terms of social impact and visibility, the significance 
of such small scale activity in toto should not be underestimated. Estimates of Chinese migrants 
in Africa range from 270000 and 750000 (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). It is hard to say what 
percentage own businesses, but certainly a sizeable percentage are entrepreneurs of various 
descriptions. Such investments tend to displace domestic firms and entrepreneurs, and create 
resentment in societies where unemployment and underemployment tends to be high, and where 
resentment to migrants of other ethnic groups – whether other tribes in the same country, other 
African countries, or elsewhere - is rarely far from the surface.  
 To what extent do these Chinese MNEs affect development?  Certainly, the ‘opportunity 
cost’ of Chinese FDI is almost zero, especially for some of the poorest host countries. That is, in 
the absence of Chinese investment there might well have been none. Bear in mind that many of 
these Chinese MNEs have – either with the help of state-sponsored loans, or independently – 
invested in parallel in infrastructural projects  such as railways and roads needed to bring the 
                                                 
12
 Given that an equivalent domestic investor is less likely to repatriate their earnings, at the very least one can also 
argue that such free standing Chinese companies. Indeed, such small-scale investors are not a new phenomenon in 
Africa: Lebanese and Indian trading companies have been engaged in such activities for almost a century throughout 
Africa.  
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natural resources to market, there would almost certainly have been little chance that other 
investors would be seek to extract these resources. It also suggests that these Chinese state-
owned MNEs view is decidedly long-term, since infrastructure and capital-intensive investment 
projects will not show a return for decades.  
The sustainable development effects beyond capital inflows can often be relatively small 
in extractive industries, regardless of nationality of ownership. They tend to employ mostly 
unskilled workers. Much of the plant, equipment and supplies are imported. Chinese firms have 
been accused of bringing in Chinese workers rather than using local employees, and of using 
Chinese suppliers rather than local ones. However, the extent to which this is done is 
exaggerated (Kragelund 2009), and reflects to a great extent the inexperience of Chinese 
companies in running international activities rather than a malevolent intent. Relatively little 
local processing of the raw materials is undertaken locally. Manufacturing investments in general 
provides greater opportunities of spillovers and linkages, and in most cases Chinese 
manufacturing activities tend to be relatively small-scale, undertake relatively low-value adding 
activities.  
 At a more general level, the motivation of the inward FDI plays an important role. Policy 
makers and commentators fall into a well-known trap of presuming that the development 
potential of every dollar of FDI flow is the same, regardless of industry and regardless of the 
capacity of the host country to efficiently utilise the spillovers and linkages that are potentially 
made available.  Not all FDI projects are equal in terms of spillovers and linkages.  $100 million 
to acquire drilling rights will likely employ a few unskilled local workers, utilising mainly 
skilled expatriates. All its equipment may be imported, and very little local processing will be 
undertaken. On the other hand, an equivalent investment the manufacturing sector (whether 
trade-supportive or market-seeking) may well employ thousands of local workers, create 
linkages with local colleges and universities, promote better farming practices amongst domestic 
producers, and create the opportunity for other investors to set up. In short, it is likely to be better 
embedded, if for no other reason than that of necessity. Domestic market oriented affiliates 
generally purchase more locally than export-oriented firms because of lower quality 
requirements and technical specifications MNEs create more linkages when they use 
intermediate goods intensively, communication costs between parent and affiliate are high and 
the home and host markets are relatively similar in terms of intermediate goods.  Driffield et al 
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(2010) note that the opportunity for spillovers tends to be lower for asset-seeking types of FDI, 
compared to asset-exploiting activities.  
Investments in infrastructure projects, likewise, may be initially capital intensive, but do 
not necessarily generate significant sequential investments, or generate relatively large amounts 
of spillovers. Indeed, the focus on initial investments rather than sequential investments – 
whether through new flows or through reinvested earnings - is an area of policy myopia, and 
illustrates again the shortcomings of using FDI flow data (Box 1).  
 The primary difference between conventional MNEs and DC MNEs in developing 
countries– as their ownerships advantages become increasingly similar - comes down to 
experience. The conventional MNEs have – ceteris paribus – greater experience with managing 
international operations. DC MNEs are not always familiar with how to build linkages, or with 
integrating themselves in local communities to become embedded in society. Certainly, as they 
acquire experience of these locations, and of operating as an MNE, they are likely to start 
developing more linkages. 
 
9. Future directions and policy implications. 
The evidence we have reviewed indicates rather starkly that there is little evidence of an across-
the-board growth in outward investment by firms from developing countries. Although there has 
been growth, this is a much narrower phenomenon, limited to a small group of home countries 
with relatively well-developed knowledge infrastructure, as well as innovation and business 
systems.  
We have argued that while these locations have spawned domestic firms which have 
expanded rapidly abroad, there is also evidence that a considerable proportion of this activity is 
somewhat premature, and based on ownership advantages that may well have been sufficient to 
succeed at home, and in host countries with similar conditions, but are ultimately insufficient to 
be sustainable in the longer run. Nonetheless, DC firms are exposed to greater competition with 
liberalisation, and this means that if they are to survive in the longer run without the benefit of 
captive domestic markets, they need be more aggressive about the upgrading of their firm-
specific assets and one means to do so is by internationalisation. However, we can also expect 
that a number of these DC MNEs will not prove able to survive in a globalised world where they 
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must compete with ‘conventional’ MNEs who have greater experience and managerial know-
how of managing across borders and achieving economies of common governance. 
Nonetheless, we can also expect – despite the probably high failure rate – a greater 
number of DC firms will seek to expand abroad, although most will demonstrate greater caution, 
and remain regional, as expected of first wave DC MNEs. We have made the point that these 
‘waves’ exist simultaneously, and are not exclusive. That is, as firms garner greater international 
experience and improving stock of ownership advantages (both transaction – and asset-type), it is 
natural for them to move towards second wave behaviour, and eventually will become 
indistinguishable from conventional or mature MNEs.  
It is not clear to us, however, that DC MNEs present a new and alternative channel for 
capital flows and knowledge flows for host developing countries. First wave MNEs may prefer 
to invest in less developed countries in low value added manufacturing or natural resource 
extracting sectors. However, these activities do not provide opportunities for significant 
knowledge transfers and on the whole cannot be expected to provide significant spillovers and 
linkages. Further, as these MNEs become more competitive, they too will shift their higher value 
adding activities to be closer to the developed countries which are their primary markets, or to 
locations which have the location-specific assets to upgrade their firm-specific assets.  In other 
words, South-South FDI is unlikely to prove as a viable alternative to North-South FDI, and 
some may argue, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, opportunities for spillovers and linkages may 
actually be lower. In the long-run, and assuming these DC MNEs continue to grow they will 
behave increasingly like their Northern counterparts, and also move their activities away, unless 
there are distinct improvements in the developing host countries location advantages.  
Ultimately, inward FDI reflects the location advantages of the host countries, and 
although they may offer cheap natural resources and low labour costs, productivity levels remain 
low. In addition, many of the poorer countries have endemic political instability, poor transport 
links and infrastructure, little skilled manpower and are distant from the most important markets. 
This means that most DC MNEs will necessarily seek to invest elsewhere. Southern MNEs seek 
the same kinds of location advantages and market opportunities as Northern MNEs, and if 
developing countries are to attract more sophisticated projects they must provide stability, human 
capital, infrastructure and reliability.  
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We have also examined the possible effect of outward FDI on the home countries of DC 
MNEs. This is an especially complex process, as we have tried to illustrate. It presumes three 
sets of embeddedness: that the subsidiary in the host country is sufficiently integrated with the 
host actors; that the subsidiary is deeply integrated with the parent firm, and that efficient 
structures exist to transfer the knowledge acquired to the home country; and lastly that the links 
with the home country innovation system promote dissemination.  Lastly, we discussed the role 
of DC MNEs in promoting South-South capital and knowledge flows, and suggest that as far as 
developmental effects are concerned, DC MNEs are not a superior option to conventional MNEs.  
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TABLE 1: Characteristics of three types of MNEs 
 
 
 ‘First Wave’ DC MNE 
1970-1980ss 
‘Second Wave’ DC MNE 
1990s 
 
‘Second Prime 
wave’ DC MNE 
2000s 
‘Conventional’ MNEs 
 
Ramamurti 
Terminology  
‘infant MNEs’ ‘Adoloscent MNEs’  Mature MNEs 
Destination regional FDI: neighbouring 
countries and other 
developing countries 
Majority still regional, but 
expanding to a global basis 
Global basis 
Motivation resource seeking & market 
seeking in developing 
countries 
In developing countries 
resource and market seeking 
in 
In industrial countries 
asset-seeking and market 
seeking in . 
Efficiency-seeking - MNE 
motivation aimed at 
optimising use of each 
country’s comparative and 
competitive advantages 
Type of 
outward FDI 
In developing cties 
natural-asset intensive, 
small scale production in 
light industries (Heksher-
Ohlin, moving towards 
undifferentiated Smithian 
industries 
In developing cties: natural 
asset intensive sectors as in 
first wave;  
In industrialised cties 
(a) assembly-type, market-
seeking FDI primarily in 
Smithian industries 
(b) asset-seeking investment 
in schumpeterian industries 
Capital- and knowledge-
intensive (schumpeterian) 
sectors capital/labour ratio 
dependent on natural/created 
asset of host. 
Ownership 
advantages 
 
Primarily country-of-
origin-specific. 
Fundamental Oa 
advantages, no Ot 
advantages 
Both firm- and country-
specific 
 
 
Mainly firm-specific  
Advanced Oa and Ot 
advantages. 
 
 
Examples of 
ownership 
advantages  
 
[adapted and 
modified 
version of 
Lall (1983) 
page 7] 
1. Conglomerate group 
ownership 
2. Technology (mostly 
adapted) 
3. Management adapted to 
third world conditions 
4. Low cost inputs 
(including managerial and 
technical personnel)  
5. ‘Ethnic’ advantages 
 
1. Conglomerate group 
ownership 
2. Management adapted to 
third world conditions 
3. Low cost inputs (including 
managerial and technical 
personnel)  
4. ‘Ethnic’ advantages 
5. Some product 
differentiation 
6. Limited marketing skills 
7.  Vertical control over 
factor/product markets 
8. Subsidised capital 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In
 b
etw
een
 seco
nd
 w
av
e
 and
 co
n
v
entio
n
al
 
1. Large size - economies of 
scale 
2. Access to capital markets 
3. Technology 
4. product differentiation 
5. Marketing know-how 
6. Cross-country management 
skills 
7. Globally efficient intra-firm 
activity 
8  Vertical control over 
factor/product markets 
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Table 2  DC outward FDI stock (as a  per cent of World outward FDI stock) 
 1993 2000 2007 
All DCs 9.77 per cent 14.02 per cent 14.66 per cent 
All DCs less BRICs 7.18 per cent 12.36 per cent 11.39 per cent 
All DCs less NICs 6.42 per cent 6.61 per cent 6.97 per cent 
All DCs less (BRICS & NICs) 3.02 per cent 3.60 per cent 2.42 per cent 
All DCs less (BRICS, NICs & 
GCCs) 
2.65 per cent 3.43 per cent 1.89 per cent 
All DCs less (BRICS, NICs,  
GCCs, Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands & Panama) 
2.05 per cent 1.83 per cent 0.44 per cent 
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Table 3 Outward FDI of 20 largest DC (excluding GCC countries and ‘tax havens’), different years  
 
 1993 2000 2007 
Sum of 20 DCs’ OFDI  195,653 758,780 2203,684 
Share of all DCs’ OFDI 87.85 per cent 88.04 per cent 96.31 per cent 
Share of World’s OFDI 8.58 per cent 12.34 per cent 14.12 per cent 
 
Sources:  
1. UNCTAD major FDI indicators (WIR2008), http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  
2. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 Edition, IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys 
 1993 2000 2007 
Home country OFDI stock OFDI stock per 
capita 
OFDI stock OFDI stock per 
capita 
OFDI stock OFDI stock per 
capita 
 
US$ 
millions 
Rank US$ dollars Rank US$ millions Rank US$ dollars Rank US$ millions Rank US$ dollars Rank 
Brazil 42688 1 277.2 5 51946 4 303.3 10 129840 5 685.8 9 
Hong Kong 39114 2 6521.2 1 388380 1 57863.5 1 1026587 1 147646.6 1 
Taiwan 36989 3 1761.8 3 66655 2 2992.1 3 158361 3 6897.9 3 
South Africa 17952 4 456.3 4 32333 5 726.2 5 54562 9 1140.3 7 
China 13768 5 11.6 18 27768 6 21.9 19 95799 6 72.5 17 
Singapore 13209 6 3984.6 2 56766 3 14093.0 2 149526 4 32583.5 2 
Argentina 8085 7 238.4 6 21141 8 574.7 7 26873 13 682.8 10 
Korea 5441 8 123.1 7 26833 7 570.8 8 66220 7 1366.6 8 
Mexico 3386 9 38.5 11 8273 12 84.5 11 44703 10 424.7 12 
Venezuela 2447 10 117.0 8 7676 13 317.5 9 13814 15 502.3 11 
Nigeria 2411 11 24.5 12 4132 15 34.7 15 5514 20 38.3 19 
Russia 2300 12 15.5 16 20141 9 137.1 12 255211 2 1794.7 6 
Malaysia 1437 13 73.5 10 15878 10 675.8 6 58175 8 2167.4 4 
Indonesia 1294 14 6.8 19 6940 14 33.8 17 21426 14 95.3 16 
Turkey 1263 15 22.7 13 3668 16 58.4 14 12210 16 177.2 14 
Chile 1111 16 80.7 9 11154 11 733.3 4 32469 11 1957.9 5 
Thailand 960 17 16.5 14 2203 18 35.3 16 7025 18 106.9 15 
Philippines 908 18 13.8 17 2044 19 26.8 18 5573 19 62.9 18 
Columbia 591 19 15.9 15 2989 17 70.6 13 10383 17 218.5 13 
India 294 20 0.3 20 1859 20 1.8 20 29412 12 25.1 20 
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Table 4 Changes in GDP and outward FDI stock per capita in 1993, 2000 and 2007 
 GDP per capita changes O/FDI per capita changes 
 1993 2000 2007 00/93 07/00 1993 2000 2007 00/93 07/00 
Low-income 
economies 
287.0 334.4 618.5 1.2 1.8 2.8 4.7 16.9 1.7 3.6 
Low-middle 
income 
economies 
541.8 866.9 2007.9 1.6 2.3 8.9 
 
20.0 65.9 2.2 3.3 
Upper-middle 
income 
economies 
3262.6 3718.9 8006.2 1.1 2.2 164.2 326.9 1169.0 2.0 3.6 
High-income 
economies 
21650.7 25794.5 38162.2 1.2 1.5 2293.9 
 
5905.3 13982.7 2.6 2.4 
20 DCs 
average 
1249.6 1640.3 3388.2 1.3 2.2 61.1 215.2 578.1 3.5 6.4 
BRICs average 643.5 972.7 2517.0 1.5 2.6 24.5 38.6 180.6 1.6 4.7 
NICs average 10559.1 13957.3 21795.5 1.3 1.6 1271.8 6730.8 16884.8 5.3 2.5 
World 4520.3 5263.9 8257.4 1.2 1.1 0 0 0 - - 
Ratio LI/HI 1.3 per 
cent 
 1.6 per 
cent 
  0.12 per 
cent 
 0.12 per 
cent 
  
Ratio LMI/HI 2.5 per 
cent 
 5.3 per 
cent 
  0.39 per 
cent| 
 0.47 per 
cent 
  
Ratio UMI/HI 15.1 per 
cent 
 21 per 
cent 
  7.2 per 
cent 
 8.4 per 
cent 
  
 
Sources: 
1. UNCTAD major FDI indicators (WIR2008), http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  
2. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 Edition, IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys 
3. World Development Indicators 2008, the World Bank 
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Table 5 Outward FDI stock of BRICs, by Industry (US$ millions or No. of deals) 
  
 Brazil1 
O/FDI stock , 2003 
Russia2 
No. of deals, 1995-2004 
India3  
Top20 OFDI , 
 Apr.1996 -Nov.2004 
China   
Accumulated Net OFDI 
at end of 2006 
Total  44,769 
 
143 
   
75025.55 
 
Primary  259 0.6 per cent 3 0.0 per 
cent 361.6 
3.6 per 
cent 
 
25.0 per 
cent 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 59 0.1 per cent 1 0.0 per 
cent 
  
816.7 1.1 per 
cent 
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 200 0.5 per cent 2 0.0 per 
cent 
  
17901.62 23.9 per 
cent 
Secondary 1,190 2.7 per cent 67 46.9 per 
cent 5,385.2 
53.5 per 
cent 7529.62 
10.00 per 
cent 
Food, beverages and tobacco 230 0.5 per cent 9 6.3 per 
cent 
    
Textiles, clothing and leather 41 0.1 per cent 
      
Wood and wood products 39 0.1 per cent 
      
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
0.1 0.0 per cent 
      
Coke, petroleum products, gas and 
nuclear fuel 
205 0.5 per cent 14 10.0 per 
cent 
    
Chemicals and chemical products 30 0.1 per cent 10 7.0 per 
cent 
    
Rubber and plastic products 143 0.3 per cent 
      
Non-metallic mineral products 23 0.1 per cent 
      
Metal and metal products 158 0.4 per cent 15 10.5 per 
cent 
    
Machinery and equipment 104 0.2 per cent 
      
Electrical and electronic equipment 134 0.3 per cent 
      
Precision instruments 0.1 0.0 per cent 
      
Motor vehicles and other transport 
equipment 
83 0.2 per cent 
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Other manufacturing 0.3 0.0 per cent 
  
5,385.2 
53.5 per 
cent 
7529.62 10.00 per 
cent 
Tertiary 43,319 96.8 per cent 73 51 per cent 3,741.9 37.1 per 
cent 48777.6 
65.01 per 
cent 
Electricity, gas and water 20 0.0 per cent 8 5.6 per 
cent   
445.54 0.6 per 
cent 
Construction 695 1.6 per cent 
    
1570.32 
 
2.1 per 
cent 
Trade 1,908 4.3 per cent 9 6.3 per 
cent 473.9 
4.7 per 
cent 
12955.2 
 
17.3 per 
cent 
Hotels and restaurants 14 0.0 per cent 
    
61.18 
 
0.1 per 
cent 
Transport, storage and communications 207 0.5 per cent 11 7.7 per 
cent 
  
7568.19 
 
10.1 per 
cent 
Finance 22,355 49.9 per cent 32 22.4 per 
cent 110.4 1.1 
- - 
Business activities 17,982 40.2 per cent - - - - - - 
Leasing and Business Services - - - - - - 19463.6 
 
25.9 per 
cent 
Real Estate - - - - - - 2018.58 
 
2.7 per 
cent 
Education 1 0.0 per cent - - - - 228.00 0.0 per 
cent 
Community, social and personal service 
activities 
138 0.3 per cent - - - - 1203.15 1.6 per 
cent 
Information Transmission, Computer 
Services and Software 
- - - - - - 1449.88 
 
1.9 per 
cent 
 
1) Adopted and modified from Sauvant, Karl P. 2005. New Sources of FDI: The BRICs Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India and China. Journal of World Investment and Trade,Vol.6, 
No.5, p.658 
2) Case study on outward foreign direct investment by Russian enterprises. Trade and Development board Commission on Enterprise, Business Facilitation and Development Expert 
Meeting on Enhancing the Productive Capacity of Developing Country Firms through Internationalization, page 6, Geneva, 2005 
3) Approved O/FDI Flow, TOP 20 (plus Brazil) Destinations. Adopted from: Sauvant, Karl P. 2005. New Sources of FDI: The BRICs Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
Journal of World Investment and Trade,Vol.6, No.5, p.667 
4) Adopted from: China Statistical Yearbook 2007, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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Table 6 Outward FDI stock of BRICs, by major destinations (US$ millions or No. of deals) 
 Brazil1 
O/FDI stock , 2003  
Russia2 
No. of deals, 1995-2004 
India3  
Top20 OFDI , Apr.1996 -Nov.2004 
China   
Accumulated Net OFDI at end of 2006 
Total 54,892  Total 143  Total 10,480.80  Total 75025.55  
Asia 
0  
Asia 
7 4.9 per 
cent Asia 
1842.2 16.1 per 
cent Asia 47978.05 
63.95 per 
cent 
 
   China * 1   
   Hong Kong 
531.1 4.6 per 
cent    Hong Kong 42269.91 
56.34 per 
cent 
 
   Mongolia  2   
   Singapore 251.3 
2.2 per 
cent    Japan 223.98 
0.30 per 
cent 
 
   Kazakhstan 4   
China 103.4 
0.9 per 
cent 
   Singapore 468.01 
0.62 per 
cent 
 
   
 
   Viet Nam  228.9 2.0 per 
cent   Republic of Korea 949.24 
1.27 per 
cent 
 
       
Sri Lanka  120.4 
1.1 per 
cent  - - 
  
        
Kazakhstan  118.6 
1.0 per 
cent     
  
      
Iran  103.4 
0.9 per 
cent     
  
       
Oman  211.7 
1.9 per 
cent     
  
       United Arab 
Emirates  173.4 
1.5 per 
cent     
Europe 6,758 12.40 pe
r cent Europe 91 
63.64 per 
cent Europe 2,693.40 23.6 Europe 2269.82 
3.03 per 
cent 
   United Kingdom 
439 0.80 per 
cent 
United Kingdom  6   
   United Kingdom 615.6 5.4    United Kingdom 201.87 
0.27 per 
cent 
   Germany 
132 0.20 per 
cent 
Lithuania  9   
   Germany 
    
   Germany 472.03 
0.63 per 
cent 
   France 
186 0.30 per 
cent 
Czech Republic  5   
   France 101 0.9    France 44.88 
0.06 per 
cent 
Luxembourg 2,062 3.80 per 
cent 
Germany  5   
   Russia 
1,751.40 15.3 
   Russia 929.76 
1.24 per 
cent 
Spain 1,794 3.30 per 
cent 
Latvia  4 
 Netherlands  225.4 2 
 
  
Portugal 1,079 2.00 per Netherlands  4 
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cent 
Other European 458 0.8 per 
cent 
Turkey 1 
 
  
  
 
  
   
Transition 
economies  76          
Caribbean Sea 37719 68.6 Caribbean Sea 
0 
 Caribbean Sea 1515.8 13.3 Caribbean Sea 18977.1 
25.29 per 
cent 
   Bahamas 
6,925 12.60 per 
cent  
   
Bermuda 
625.3 5.5 
   Bahamas 17.52 
0.02 per 
cent 
   Cayman Islands 
22,248 40.50 per 
cent  
   
   Virgin Is. (E) 803.4 7    Cayman Islands 14209.19 
18.94 per 
cent 
   Virgin Is. (E) 
6,710 12.20 per 
cent  
   Malta  87.1 0.8 
   Virgin Is. (E) 4750.4 
6.33 per 
cent 
Africa 
0  
Africa 
0  
Africa 
1,917.70 16.8 
Africa 2556.82 
3.41 per 
cent 
            Mauritius  1,005.70 8.8     
            Sudan  912 8     
Latin America 
6286 11.40 pe
r cent Latin America 
0  
Latin America 
32 0.3 
Latin America 19694.37 
26.25 per 
cent 
Panama 779 1.40 per 
cent  
    
Brazil 32 0.3    Mexico 128.61 
0.17 per 
cent 
Uruguay 3,641 6.60 per 
cent  
    
 
  
   
North America 
2293 4.20 per 
cent North America 
6 4.20 per 
cent North America 
2,145.40 18.8 per 
cent North America 1587.02 
2.12 per 
cent 
   Canada 
    
   Canada 
    
   United States 
2,145.40 18.8 per 
cent    Canada 140.72 
0.19 per 
cent 
   United States 
2,293 4.20 per 
cent 
United States  6   
 
  
   United States 1237.87 
1.65 per 
cent 
Oceania 
324 0.60 per 
cent Oceania 
0  
Oceania 
334.3 2.9 per 
cent Oceania 939.48 
1.25 per 
cent 
   Australia 
324 0.60 per 
cent 
 
    
   Australia 
334.3 2.9 per 
cent    Australia 794.35 
1.06 per 
cent 
   
    
 
    
 
    
   New Zealand 51.27 
0.07 per 
cent 
Others 1,378 2.50 per 
cent 
Others 24 16.78 per 
cent 
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1) Adopted and modified from Sauvant, Karl P. 2005. New Sources of FDI: The BRICs Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. Journal of World Investment and Trade,Vol.6, No.5, p.656 
2) Case study on outward foreign direct investment by Russian enterprises. Trade and Development board Commission 
on Enterprise, Business Facilitation and Development Expert Meeting on Enhancing the Productive Capacity of 
Developing Country Firms through Internationalization, page 6, Geneva, 2005 
3) Approved O/FDI Flow, TOP 20 (plus Brazil) Destinations. Adopted from: Sauvant, Karl P. 2005. New Sources of FDI: 
The BRICs Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India and China. Journal of World Investment and Trade,Vol.6, No.5, 
p.666 
4) Adopted from: China Statistical Yearbook 2007, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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Table 7  Outward FDI and R&D relevant indices of 20 DCs 
Country 
FDI 
Outflows 
as  per cent 
of GDP, 
2000-05 
Royalty 
and 
License 
Fees 
Receipts 
(US$/pop.)
, 2006 
Researcher
s in R&D / 
Mil. 
People, 
2006 
Total 
Expenditur
e for R&D 
as  per cent 
of GDP, 
2006 
University-
Company 
Research 
Collaborati
on (1-7), 
2007 
Scientific 
and 
Technical 
Journal 
Articles / 
Mil. 
People, 
2005 
Patents 
Granted by 
USPTO / 
Mil. 
People, 
avg 2002-
2006 
High-Tech 
Exports as 
 per cent of 
Manuf. 
Exports, 
2005 
Firm-Level 
Technolog
y 
Absorption 
(1-7), 2007 
Value 
Chain 
Presence 
(1-7), 2007 
Internet 
Users per 
1000 
People, 
2006 
ICT 
Expenditur
e as  per 
cent of 
GDP, 
2006" 
Argentina 0.2 1.76 768.04 0.44 2.9 78.92 1.4 6.6 4.2 2.8 210 6.9 
Brazil 0.4 0.55 462.06 0.91 3.4 52.93 0.75 12.8 4.9 3.6 230 6.4 
Chile 2.3 3.36 832.74 0.68 3.5 95.67 0.93 4.8 5.2 4 250 5.2 
China 0.2 0.12 714.61 1.34 4.1 31.89 0.35 30.6 5 3.7 100 5.3 
Colombia 1.1 0.25 127.08 n/a 3.2 8.9 0.24 4.9 4.2 3.7 150 8 
Hong Kong, 
China 16.4 35.31 2.120.42 0.74 4.6 275.03 91.75 33.9 5.8 5.6 550 8.8 
India 0.2 0.02 n/a 0.61 3.5 13.35 0.3 4.9 5.6 4.6 50 6.1 
Indonesia 0.3 1.19 n/a n/a 3.1 0.93 0.08 16.3 4.7 3.7 70 3.1 
Korea, Rep. 0.6 41.53 3.723.28 2.99 5.4 339.5 88.44 32.3 6 5.7 700 6.6 
Malaysia 1.6 1.07 508.93 0.63 4.9 23.97 3.03 54.7 5.8 5 430 6.8 
Mexico 0.4 0.83 331.46 0.41 3.2 37.85 0.95 19.6 4.4 4 180 3.3 
Nigeria n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.1 2.56 0.02 1.7 4.4 3.2 60 3.4 
Philippines 0.1 0.07 44.33 0.14 3.1 2.1 0.24 71 4.9 4.1 50 6.7 
Russian 
Federation 1.5 2.1 3.246.21 1.07 3.2 100.68 1.34 8.1 4.1 2.6 180 3.2 
Singapore 9.2 125.41 5.479.14 2.36 5.3 831.22 97.01 56.6 6 5.4 380 9.3 
South Africa -0.3 0.97 386.43 0.87 4.2 51.01 2.71 6.6 5.4 3.4 110 10 
Taiwan, 
China n/a n/a 3.839.12 n/a 5.1 476.95 293.44 42.6 6 5.2 640 6.3 
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Thailand 0.2 0.72 286.87 0.25 4.1 19.82 0.66 26.6 5.2 3.9 130 4 
Turkey 0.3 0 476.12 0.67 3.3 108.44 0.26 1.5 5.4 4.3 170 8.2 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.7 0 206.51 0.25 2.9 20.09 0.89 2.7 4.6 2.4 150 3.7 
 
Country 
FDI 
Outflows 
as  per cent 
of GDP, 
2000-05 
Royalty 
and 
License 
Fees 
Receipts 
(US$/pop.)
, 2006 
Researcher
s in R&D / 
Mil. 
People, 
2006 
Total 
Expenditur
e for R&D 
as  per cent 
of GDP, 
2006 
University-
Company 
Research 
Collaborati
on (1-7), 
2007 
Scientific 
and 
Technical 
Journal 
Articles / 
Mil. 
People, 
2005 
Patents 
Granted by 
USPTO / 
Mil. 
People, 
avg 2002-
2006 
High-Tech 
Exports as 
 per cent of 
Manuf. 
Exports, 
2005 
Firm-Level 
Technolog
y 
Absorption 
(1-7), 2007 
Value 
Chain 
Presence 
(1-7), 2007 
Internet 
Users per 
1000 
People, 
2006 
ICT 
Expenditur
e as  per 
cent of 
GDP, 
2006" 
World 4.47 32.51 1.659.76 0.95 3.35 159.91 22.04 10.9 4.77 3.83 233.64 5.82 
Netherlands 12.2 252.46 2.297.77 1.79 5 850.8 92.52 30.1 5.5 5.7 890 6.3 
G7 3 129.21 3.606.84 2.19 4.66 590.94 146.45 20.2 5.61 5.61 580 6.6 
High 
Income 14.76 107.19 3.330.26 1.88 4.29 499.37 78.09 17.89 5.53 4.91 514.36 6.04 
Low Income 0.04 0.08 141.35 0.35 2.75 2.78 0.02 7.08 4.35 3.03 38.24 6.25 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 
0.28 3.32 693.59 0.39 2.75 14.63 0.16 7.23 4.28 3.29 123 5.26 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
0.6 4 967.41 0.61 3.3 76.84 1.22 10.03 4.66 3.68 238.15 5.84 
 
Source: Knowledge for Development, Knowledge Assessment Methodology, Custom Scorecards (KAM 2008) , the World Bank 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP) 
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Figure 1 DC OFDI stock (percentage of World’s OFDI) 
 
DC OFDI stock (share of the world's OFDI)
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14.00%
16.00%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
All DCs OFDI stock
DCs less BRICs
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DCs less (BRICs & NICs)
DCs less (BRICs, NICs & GCCs)
DCs less (BRICs, NICs,GCCs, Virgin Is., Cayman Is. & Panama)
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Foreign 
subsidiary 
Universities 
 
Public 
research 
organisations 
Suppliers 
Customers 
Parent firm 
in home 
country 
Universities 
 
Public 
Research 
organisations 
Suppliers 
Customers 
For outward MNE activity to influence the home country economy, all 
three of these sets of linkages must be well-developed 
Substantial links must 
exist between 
subsidiary and host 
sources of knowledge 
MNE must have highly 
integrated structure, 
and possess 
O advantages to 
manage complex cross-
border R&D structure 
Strong links with 
domestic innovation 
system in home country 
need to exist 
Figure 2: conditions that permit upgrading of the home country’s L advantages by 
ourwad MNE activity 
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Figure 3 the relationship between L advantages, O advantages, and propensity to 
engage in outward MNE activity. 
 
 
O advantage
s of foreign-
owned 
MNEs 
O advantage
s of 
domestic 
firms 
L advantages that are 
location-bound and available 
to all economic actors, e.g.: 
• Infrastructure 
• Science base 
• Natural resources 
• Human capital 
 
L advantages that derive from 
activities of firms in that 
location, e.g.: 
• Agglomeration 
economies 
• Networks of 
suppliers/customers 
 
L advantages that derive from 
O advantages of foreign and 
domestic firms which are 
potentially available to all firms 
+ 
+ 
O advantages that are location-
bound 
= 
Potential to 
engage in 
outward MNE 
activity 
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